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Abstract 
After October 1987, financial crisis, market regulators created dispositive called circuit 
breaks to contain high levels of volatility. As a type of circuit break, price limits were adopted not 
only on stock markets but in commodity futures contracts as well, however, its effects are not clear. 
The present study aimed to evaluate price limit ex-ante effects on the four major wheat futures 
markets by adopting Brogaard and Roshak (2015) methodology by estimating the probability of 
extreme movements and limit moves conditional to extreme movements and its ex-post effects on 
trading activity by contrasting the volume curve on limit days with a counterfactual volume curve 
that simulates a scenario where price limits were not hit. The results show that tighter limit levels 
decrease the probability of extreme movements by approximately 0.008% having an overall (four 
markets included) baseline probability of extreme moves equals 1.11% which agrees with the 
Holding Back hypothesis assuming extreme movements as a proxy for volatility. On the other 
hand, the probability of limit moves conditional to extreme movements increases when limit levels 
are tighter by approximately 0.066% with an overall baseline of 0.05% which supports the 
“Magnet” hypothesis. Regarding the ex-post effects, longer periods where prices stay at the limit 
level result in trading activity lost, however, if prices return to limit range but bounce back to a 
limit lock, the longer the gap between limit locks trading session experience an increase in trading 
activity. Moreoever, the ex-post effects on trading activity are more intense in Chicago relative to 
Kansas City because Chicago present a higher trading volume on average. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Commodity futures markets are used by producers and consumers as a risk management tool to 
hedge themselves against price risk. Therefore, futures prices need to be trustworthy benchmarks 
of the actual value of the underlying commodity. To guarantee price integrity, futures market prices 
should be subject to volatility derived from fundamental supply and demand factors but not 
volatility coming from non-fundamental reasons. In particular, futures prices should not be subject 
to bubbles and other feedback loops where high prices lead to even higher prices. Exchanges use 
mechanisms called circuit breakers which aiming to halt trading when this latter kind of volatility 
causes prices to overreact. Trading halts and price limits are examples of circuit breaks used by 
exchanges around the globe and cast multiple viewpoints about its effectiveness. Proponents would 
say that circuit breaks work as a speed bump in a rapid decline or increase. Critics would say that 
circuit breaks that interruptions inhibit efficient pricing. 
To illustrate how they work, trading halts were created after the October 1987 market crash 
and are based on levels of change in price relative to the previous close. For instance, On S&P 500 
index, NYSE sets three levels of change in price as their threshold, 7%, 13%, and 20%. If the index 
has a change in the price of 7% up or down, there is a trading halt of 15 minutes. After this period 
trade resumes and, if the second level gets hit, then another trading halt of 15 minutes is triggered. 
In case the third level gets hit, then trading stops for the rest of the day. 
 For price limits, let’s consider that a certain exchange based on previous price behavior 
set a price limit of 55 cents for the corn futures contract. If the previous settlement price was $3.75 
per bushel, the limit range would be between $ 4.30 and $3.20 per bushel. As a form of “too far, 
too fast” condition to restrict volatility, price limits are set based on current market information 
aiming to resemble a realistic volatility status. In more detail, the limit range is established daily 
by a specific amount higher or lower than the previous day’s settlement price. Nonetheless, restrict 
price to freely ranges brings questions regarding its effects on price behavior before and after a 
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limit move. Price limits are the most used method to mitigate price volatility in commodity futures 
markets since the 20th century and is the focus of this study since its effects on this markets are 
still unclear Daily price limits may affect trading activity and prices after prices hit limit bounds 
(ex-post) and before a limit hit (ex-ante). In theory, price limits were developed to restrain 
excessive volatility that could drive prices quickly to levels not sustained by fundamental reasons, 
but skeptical to the policy would say the opposite due to its effect on trading behavior. Moreover, 
with limits, there is no direct way to calculate the impairment caused on trading activity since the 
alternative scenario where limits do not apply doesn’t apply to the same market circumstances. 
With that, what are the ex-ante effects of price limits that could influence prices to get to the limit? 
Moreover, what is the comportment of trading activity before, when the limit gets hit and after? 
Price limits ex-ante effects could be reflected in trade behavior. Traders could use limit 
levels as a signal to develop their strategies. In face of a high volatility period and extreme move 
in price leading it to the limit level, traders could anticipate their trades as they visualize a real 
chance that price hits the limit which Subrahmanyam (1994) addresses as the “Magnet” 
hypothesis. The opposite could also happen, where traders in face of a high volatility period would 
delay their orders for a stillness moment when prices would be subjected to regular levels of 
volatility described by Subrahmanyam (1997). A good way to untangle this dilemma is to estimate 
the likelihood of extreme moves or limit hits conditional to price limits in the commodity futures 
market. 
 Trading activity empirically is affected on both moments, before and after a limit hit 
essentially being shifting back and forward, however, its main change is observed from an ex-post 
perspective. Right before a limit hit, volume tends to spike to levels relatively similar to the open 
or close decreasing drastically during the period where the limit is locked and resuming with 
another peak if prices return to levels below the limit. This market phenomenon fairly looks like 
another U-shaped pattern investigated by Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) inside the day. This shift 
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in trading activity would certainly impose a cost. Without a scenario where price limits are not 
applied, one way to overcome this obstacle is to estimate this cost by calculating the difference in 
trading activity between the volume in a limit day and a counterfactual scenario that would 
represent the absence of price limits. 
This paper assesses the effects of price limits on price behavior before and after limits are 
hit. We also estimate the realized costs of imposing price limits in terms of shifted trading activity. 
Both efforts rely on the presence of other unconstrained or less constrained markets to estimate 
the relevant counterfactual and trading activity that would have occurred in the absence of price 
limits. To better identify this counterfactual, we apply our analysis to the wheat futures complex, 
the four actively traded and liquid wheat futures contracts originally based in Chicago, Kansas 
City, Minneapolis, and Paris. 
In the ex-ante sphere, we use a similar methodology as Brogaard and Roshak (2015) on 
estimating the probability of a limit move and an extreme move conditional to specific features of 
the commodity futures market through a Difference-in-difference linear probability model. In our 
study, three elements are crucial to set our model. First is the possibility to test price limit policy 
as our treatment by using the Paris wheat futures contract as our control which is feasible by not 
being under the price limit regime. Second is based in the fact that after the commodity boom in 
2008, due to frequent large price changes, CME Group abandoned a constant price limit and 
established a periodical review on limit levels for various commodities which is the treatment in 
our model to answer if a tighter limit level increase or decrease the likelihood of a limit move. 
Third is in our definition of extreme movements. Price changes equivalent to 25 cents are 
addressed as extreme movements. Knowing the likelihood of extreme movements can enlighting 
the ex-ante effects of price limit on price behavior. 
Trading activity could also be subjective to the ex-post effects of price limits. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) investigate intraday patterns in stocks evoking the U-shaped theory over volume. 
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We can apply this concept in commodity futures since empirically daily volume behaves in a U-
shaped curve (volume peak at the opening following by lower levels throughout the trading session 
and surging again at the end of the trading session). Theoretically, if there is an ex-post effect of 
price limits, a volume U-shaped pattern could be observed where volume peak at the moment 
prices hit the limit level and reduces as prices keep locked at the limit level following by a 
considerable increase when prices return to price range. Unfortunately, a little has been discussed 
in the literature about trading activity and price limits in agricultural commodity markets, therefore 
this is study throw light on the subject. 
As our ex-ante effects estimates, a tighter limit level reduces the probability of an extreme 
movement for both treated and control variables, which corroborate with the “Holding Back” 
hypothesis taking extreme movements as a proxy for volatility as Brogaard and Roshak (2015). 
However, regarding the probability of limit moves conditional to extreme movements, we observe 
the opposite conclusion. A tighter limit level increases the likelihood of a limit move corroborating 
with the “Magnet” hypothesis suggested by (Subrahmanyam, 1994). Ex-post effects of price limit 
on trading activity have a similar ambiguous behavior. Trading activity has a unique behavior 
when prices are about to hit the limit. Around a limit hit, trading activity shifts concentrating 
seconds before a limit hit and creating a peak on volume. Seconds before the hit, trading activity 
tends to reduce drastically surging again if prices return inside the limit bound.  This behavior is 
subject most by how long prices will stay at the limit level and/or if prices will hit the limit level 
multiple times in a session. Our results indicate that the longer is the period where prices are at the 
limit, the greater is the trading activity loss in comparison with a possible scenario where price 
limits would not apply which is expressed by our counterfactual volume curve. Moreover, if prices 
hit the limit level multiple times in a session and the time between hits are longer, the trading 
session can experience an increase in trading activity since volume speak right before the limit hit 
is not compensated by the loss in trading activity when price stay at the limit for a longer time. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Price limits are commonly applied to many exchanges and are not exclusive to commodity 
futures markets. In fact, after the “flash crash”, exchanges had to bring safety manners to preserve 
market integrity and improve failures. The literature provides several studies about how effective 
this type of circuit breaks on different financial instruments. Brogaard and Roshak (2015) develop 
a creative way to evaluate the ex-ante effects of price limits on stock markets after exchanges 
decide to establish this policy. The authors evaluate the ex-ante effects of price limits by 
developing a Difference-in-difference model aiming to estimate the probability of extreme 
movements and limit moves on the stock market. The inventiveness of the study lays in the fact 
their unit of observation is checked on the stock price “path”. Limit and extreme moves are 
identified when prices change a certain amount in a brief period where the later consist of a ten 
percent change within five minutes and the former a change between seven and eight percent 
within one to three minutes. The Difference-in-difference approach could be applied through the 
fact of two differences: 1) between stocks, and 2) across time. The authors could distinguish stocks 
in two groups, the ones under price limit policy (S&P 500 and Russell 1000) and the ones not 
under price limit regime. Moreover, the price limit regime is effective only after June 10, 2010, 
for stocks listed on S&P 500 index, and September 10, 2010, for stocks listed on Russell 1000 
index which gives the difference across time. 
 The results are focused to verify two hypotheses: 1) “Magnet”, and 2) “Holding Back”. 
Subrahmanyam (1994) defines the “Magnet” hypothesis as a price overreaction where uninformed 
traders would move their trades forward in time due to an imminent possibility of a price limit hit 
which would increase extreme price movements as consequence. The “Holding Back” hypothesis, 
defined by Subrahmanyam (1997) suggests a price underreaction. Informed traders would trade 
less aggressively due to an imminent possibility of a price limit hit which would result in fewer 
extreme price movements. Brogaard and Roshak (2015) suggest in their findings that price limits 
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reduce the possibility of extreme movements and also concludes that even could make them less 
extreme which corroborates with the “Holding Back” hypothesis. Evaluating price variation, the 
authors conclude that, in the presence of a price limit regime, price variation strongly reduces 
which also fits with the “Holding Back” hypothesis.  
A Difference-in-differences model is also used by Hautsch and Horvath (2019) to 
investigate how effective circuit breaks are and if actually, this market regulation delivers 
increment in market quality. In the same framework as Brogaard and Roshak (2015), the study 
approach Nasdaq stocks order book after May 2010 when the regulation was implemented, 
however attempting to understand three points: (i) if indeed trading pauses reduce volatility by 
providing a “cool off” period; (ii) do trading pauses affect liquidity? And; (iii) if trading pauses 
promote price discovery and how those pauses could be used by market agents to set their 
strategies. Differently from price limits, trading pauses only interrupt orders to be executed and it 
triggers by a precise and publicly known rule which permits the authors to verify price conversion 
at an intra-pause level and thus evaluate trading pause effects on price discovery. 
 Therefore Hautsch and Horvath (2019) evaluate metrics for volatility, liquidity, price 
stability on their treatment and control sample, and create a matching logic during the trading pause 
period to observe any evidence on price discovery. In this case, the treatment group was addressed 
by the stocks where trading pauses occurred after May 2010, and the control group was addressed 
as the same stocks, but before the trading pause policy was implemented and that experienced 
price movements by more than 5% in five minutes (Extreme movements).  Their results suggest 
that contrary to circuit break’s function, trading pauses reduce price stability, liquidity, and support 
the “Magnet” hypothesis.  
On commodity futures markets, Janardanan et.al. (2019) also investigate price behavior 
and trader positions around limit move events. The authors try to answer three questions: 1) Do 
price limit mitigates speculative activity of market participants, 2) What causes limit events to 
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occur, and 3) Do price limits affect price discovery? To answer those questions, the authors 
perform empirical observation and regression analysis with net positions of commercial and non-
commercial traders which are reported by CFTC (Commodity Futures Trading Commission) 
weekly. Their analysis englobes the agricultural commodity complex on the futures market. The 
data includes contracts for soybean oil (BO), corn (C), cotton (CT), feeder cattle (FC), Kansas City 
wheat (KW), live cattle (LC), lean hogs (LH), oats (O), rough rice (RR), soybean (S), soybean 
meal (SM), and soft red winter wheat (W) in a daily frequency. Their sample goes from January 
07, 1991, to May 23, 2016. To evaluate trading behavior, the authors used the Commitment of 
Traders (COT) reports provided by the CFTC weekly. To evaluate price discovery, option prices 
for each futures contract provided by the Commodity Research Bureau (CRB) were used. The 
speculative activity should decrease around limit events where speculators would reduce their net 
long position after an upper limit hit and reduce their short position after a lower limit hit which 
would make prices to reverse and decrease volatility levels after a limit event (Ma et.al., 1989).  
Answering the first question, the authors found that, on average, non-commercial traders 
do not change their net long and short position from one week to the other. Moreover, after an 
upper limit hit, non-commercial traders reduce their net short position and, after a lower limit hit, 
non-commercial traders reduce their net long position. The behavior found goes against Ma et.al.  
(1989) findings. All those changes in position occur in direction to the limit move which indicates 
that non-commercial traders could behave that way to avoid margin calls due to movements against 
their positions. The second query lays in the reason why limit events occur. From an ex-ante 
perspective, the authors investigate the net position before a limit move to evaluate if the 
speculative activity is the reason for those events. As a result, no change in net position for non-
commercial traders is found which dismisses the hypothesis that speculative activity as the drive 
for a limit move. Nonetheless, verifying implied volatility before and after a limit event indicated 
that fundamental reasons are most likely to drive prices to the limit bands. By observing a constant 
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or even an increase in implied volatility after a limit event indicates that fundamental reasons are 
driving prices to a limit event. According to them, if volatility is not controlled by price limit after 
a limit move, prices are subjected to fundamental changes that are driving prices to new 
equilibrium levels, thus in this situation price limits are delaying price discovery. 
 As an ex-post effect of price limits, delay in price discovery is the subject of their third 
question. To assess that, the authors evaluate average returns after a limit day to check if price 
behavior returns to previous levels or persist to new equilibrium levels. As a conclusion, on 
average the returns after a limit event tends to go towards the limit band. Observing the options 
data the authors test the hypothesis that there is a migration towards options contract due to delay 
price discovery of the futures market. As an inference, the authors calculate the ratio between the 
open interest of futures and options and the open interest of futures-only. Observing the ratio after 
a limit event, the open interest of options increase after upper and lower limit hit which corroborate 
with the hypothesis that due delayed price discovery, there is a trading activity migration towards 
options markets. 
Ex-post effects of price limits are also studied by Reiffen et.al. (2011) on the major 
agricultural commodity futures contracts. The authors evaluate the delay in price discovery on 
those markets comparing futures contracts with options. In their study, the concept of Continuation 
and Reversal is used. When the opening price of a day following a limit hit is higher than the 
previous limit level we can observe what it’s called Continuation movement. For the opposite, 
where the opening price for a day following a limit hit is lower than the previous limit level and 
goes in the opposite direction, we observe a Reversal movement. As their findings, with or without 
options contracts as an alternative market, Continuation movements are more common after a limit 
hit day. Moreover, the authors used call-put parity which consists of a strategy to implied futures 
prices using options, to evaluate if this “synthetic” price would be a good predictor for the 
following day of a limit event. Since options contracts are not subjected to price limit, market 
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agents could use them, for some cost, in case of delay in price discovery. As a result, those 
“synthetic” prices present a good correlation with future prices (with non-limit event days) and 
also indicate on their prediction that prices tend to go towards the limit band which indicates a 
delay in price discovery and a good market alternative for traders in terms of price. Their findings 
based on changes in volume between futures and options suggests that traders migrate to options 
when limit hit events happen to have greater price discovery.   
A little has been discussed in the literature about trading activity and price limits, however, 
an interesting discussion has been brought to light about intraday patterns on stock markets. 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) approach the subject by investigating intraday trading patterns 
through models using the same principle of Subrahmanyam (1994, 1997) on the trader’s strategy, 
however, the authors divided traders based on motives to trade, in that case, liquidity and 
information. Liquidity and informed traders can trade at any time (discretionary) preferably when 
there is a “thick” market (enough volume that their trading would not affect price), however, 
liquidity traders usually trade concentratedly due to their preference for “thick” moments. The 
intensity of trading at the open and close are due to the fact that these trading time marks are right 
after and before a period when is difficult and impossible to trade. Therefore, according to the 
authors, volume peaks on those moments because liquidity traders are seeking for liquidity and 
informed traders positioned themselves to enjoy relative high volumes.  
Empirically, during limit move days in agricultural commodity markets, the longer prices 
stayed locked at the limit level we see an intraday U-shaped pattern where volume peaks close to 
the moment when prices hit the limit and ceased through the period where price stayed locked. If 
prices return to levels below the limit, volume peaks again, creating a trading imbalance during 
the session. 
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
 For this study, we use daily and intraday wheat futures contracts price and volume data 
from January 2007 to April 2019 for the world wheat futures market complex: the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Soft Red Winter Wheat (SRW) and Kansas City Hard Red Winter 
Wheat (KC HRW) contracts, the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX) Hard Red Spring Wheat 
(HRSW) contract, and Euronext Milling Wheat N° 2 (EBM) contract. For brevity, we refer to each 
contract using the city with which it is commonly associated (i.e. Chicago, Kansas City, 
Minneapolis, and Paris, respectively). For Paris data, prices are converted to US currency and 
quantity aiming to match CME price and contract specification.  
Daily price data were collected from Bloomberg Terminal. For each year, all delivery 
months are collected it, however after 2015, Euronext changes its delivery months for wheat 
contracts. For Euronext EBM contracts, the delivery months are November (X), January (F), 
March (H) and May (K) until May 2015 and then September (U), December (Z), March (H) and 
May (K) from September 2015 onwards. In respect to CME contracts, SRW and KC HRW cover 
March (H), May (K), July (N), September (U) and December (Z). 
Intraday price and volume data were purchased from CQG Inc. Data is available for the 
Kansas City, Chicago, and Paris contracts. This data reports the price and volume for every trade 
in each market in chronological order, time-stamped to the minute.  
There are two sections in our methodology. The first one describes all procedures and 
models to estimate the ex-ante effects of price limits by estimating the probabilities of extreme 
movements and limit movements under different conditions. The second describes all procedures 
to estimate ex-post effects of price limit on volume by constructing a counterfactual volume curve 
to project what would happen with trade activity if there were no limit hits. With that, we compare 
our counterfactual volume with the actual volume during limit days to assess price limits effect on 
trading activity and estimate its costs. 
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  Price limit ex-ante evaluation 
To evaluate ex-ante effects of price limits, market moments and factors have to be taken 
into consideration whereas they could influence price trajectory towards the limit. Our selected 
market moment is the existence of extreme movements. Large price move could be associated with 
limit hits as traders could use those as a signal to anticipate or delay their orders. Moreover, price 
limit levels and even other market factors like volatility, more active market, and public report 
releases could affect the likelihood of an extreme movement or even a limit hit. Therefore, to assess 
the ex-ante effects of price limits we estimate the probability of extreme movements and the 
probability of limit moves conditional to extreme movements in the wheat futures market complex, 
in a difference-in-difference approach using Linear Probability Model (LPM) adapted from 
Brogaard & Roshak (2015). With that we estimate: 
• P(extreme movements) 
The Probability of extreme movements due to different markets, limit levels, limit level 
changes through time, volume, days to expiration, delivery period, and exogenous variables such 
as VIX Index, and fundamental reports (i.e. WASDE). 
• P(Limit movements | extreme movements) 
Probability of limit movements given extreme movements happened due to different 
markets, limit level, limit level changes through time, volume, days to expiration, and exogenous 
variables such as VIX Index, and fundamental reports (i.e. WASDE).  
The Difference-in-difference approach is possible since Paris contracts do not use daily 
price limit policy. Moreover, CME Group resets the daily price limit every six months since 2014 
which gives variation in the “treatment” variable across time. The analysis imposes extreme 
movements as an oscillation in price greater or equal to 25 cents. For limit move, change in price 
relative to the previous day price close must be biding with the respective daily limit on the given 
day. CME group reset the daily price limit levels every six months since 2014. Figure 1 shows 
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how daily price limit levels behave through time. Before 2014, limit levels were constant and just 
had a reset process in 2008 due to the commodity boom prices which made limit moves more 
frequent since limit levels were not effective to those volatility levels. The first reset happens in 
May based on the average of the settlement price from the 45 consecutive days of the nearest July 
contract before and on the business day before April 16th. The calculated average multiplied by 
7% and rounded to the nearest 5 cents per bushel, or 30 cents per contract, whichever is higher, 
will be the preliminary initial price limit. The same procedure is done to KC HRW contract and 
the higher preliminary initial price limit will be the new initial price limit for Wheat futures and 
will become effective on the first trading day in May until the last trading day in October.  
 
Figure 1 - Historical daily limit levels for CBOT and KC 
The second reset occurs on the first trading day in November based on the average of the 
settlement price from the 45 consecutive days of the nearest December contract before and on the 
business day before October 16th. The calculated average multiplied by 7% and rounded to the 
nearest 5 cents per bushel, or 30 cents per contract, whichever is higher, will be the preliminary 
initial price limit. The same procedure is applied to the Kansas City contract and the higher 
preliminary initial price limit will be the new initial price limit for Wheat futures and will become 
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effective on the first trading day in November until the last trading day in next April. Those 
changes in price limit levels are important to our model to evaluate the effect of price level changes 
through time on estimate probabilities. Minneapolis's daily limit is fixed in 30 cents for the whole 
period. 
 Extreme move probability models 
Our study proposes two models for each extreme move probability estimative. The first 
model estimating the probability of extreme movements discriminating price limit in levels. The 
second model discriminate price limit levels as “tight” or not relative to the previous price limit 
level. Our first model for P(Extreme movements) is shown in Equation 1. 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
4
𝑚=1
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡50𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡35𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡30𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽
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𝑛=1
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽21𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡
+ 𝛽23𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡 
Extreme is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, on market m, contract c at day t experienced an 
extreme movement. Markets are dummy variables to discriminate which of the four markets the 
contract c belongs (i.e CBOT, KC, MGEX or Euronext-Paris) at day t. Limit50, Limit35, and 
Limit30 are dummy variables to express the price limit levels on market m, contract c at day t. 
Limit50 is equal to unity for price limit levels less or equal to 50 cents and 0 otherwise. Limit35 is 
equal to unity for price limit levels less or equal to 35 and 0 otherwise and Limit30 is equal to unity 
for price limit levels less or equal to 30 and 0 otherwise. The ten Reset variables are dummy 
variables for each reset on price limit levels in CBOT and KC which happens every 6 months. Lag 
Extreme for market m, contract c, and day  t  is a dummy variable equal to one if the previous day 
experienced a extreme movement. Lag Limit Move for market m, contract c, and day t is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the previous day experienced a limit move. Life variable corresponds to 
days before the expiration on market m, for contract c at day t. Delivery is a dummy variable 
standing for the delivery period (last twelve days of the contract) when price limits are not applied 
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and are equal to 1 when contracts are at this period or 0 otherwise. The exogenous variables are 
VIX for CBOE Volatility index and REPORTS is expressed as a dummy variable equals to 1 for 
time t when a fundamental report is released (i.e. WASDE). 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
4
𝑚=1
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑇𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽
10
𝑛=1
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽17𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +   𝛽19𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽20𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡 
The second model for P(Extreme movements) is shown in equation 2. All variables are the same 
except that Limit50, Limit35, and Limit30 are replaced by Tight which is a dummy variable equals 
to unity when the daily limit is narrower relative to the previous level and 0 otherwise. The Tight 
variable is an attempt to synthesize the dynamic effect of limit levels due to its periodical reset. In 
theory, tighter limits could increase the probability of extreme movements and limit move since 
the price range allowed is narrow in comparison with the previous price range established by the 
limit bounds. 
 Limit move probability models 
We design two models to estimate the probability of limit moves. The third model uses the 
same concept as those models before, however, it estimates a conditional probability of a limit 
movement given an extreme movement occurrence and is shown in Equation 3:  
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
4
𝑚=1
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡50𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡35𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡30𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽
10
𝑛=1
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽18𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽19𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽20𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽21𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽22𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡 
LimitMove is a dummy variable equals to unity when the difference in price relative to 
previous day close price on market m, contract c, at day t is binding with the limit level at day t or 
0 otherwise. All other variables are the same as Equation 1 except for Delivery which during that 
period price limits do not apply.  
As our fourth model, a conditional probability of a limit movement given an extreme 
movement occurrence is shown in Equation 4. The variables are the same as Equation 3, however, 
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limit levels are replaced by Tight variable, which is a dummy variable equal to unity when the 
limit price level is tighter or equal relative to the previous price limit level.  
𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽
4
𝑚=1
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑇𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽
10
𝑛=1
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  
+  𝛽17𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽18𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽19𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽20𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆𝑡 
After evaluating the probabilities estimated for each model, the models with greater 
performance are used to display estimate probabilities using our control (Paris) data and other three 
markets (CBOT, KC, and MGEX) aiming to evaluate our treatments (reset window period) in a 
difference-in-difference layout. The plots are confronted with the regression coefficients for each 
probability estimate. 
 Price limit ex-post evaluation 
To estimate the ex-post effects of price limits we assess how limit moves affect trading 
activity using intraday data of wheat futures contract from two major markets, Chicago and Kansas 
City. Our data are composed of 392 limit days occurred in Chicago and Kansas City from 2008 
until 2017.The data shows that trading activity can be shifted according to limit hit and its duration. 
The longer price limits bind the more likely it becomes that trading volume is curtailed. In contrast, 
a short period with limit bonded, could likely behave as a price shock and increase trading activity. 
Additionally, volume peak could happen moments before the limit hit, thus indicating a lag effect 
of price limits on trading activity. Changes in trading activity could result in costs such as a 
decrease in price discovery and trading activity lost. Consequently, we estimate the ex-post effect 
of price limits on trading activity by observing the behavior of volume during a limit move day 
and compare it with a counterfactual volume curve which is a representation of what could happen 
with volume if there was no limit hit. 
The intraday data used has a minute resolution allowing to identify the exact minute when 
prices hit the limit, however not exactly when inside the minute. Since electronic trading enables 
a larger number of orders to be executed in seconds, this resolution prevents us to measure how 
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much trading activity we have before, before, at the limit, and during the limit lock. To overcome 
this limitation, since the filled orders are placed chronologically in the data, we manage it to 
equally distribute all trades that happened within a minute yielding a “sequential intra-minute” 
time-bin resolution. After arranging the data to this resolution, we construct our counterfactual 
volume curve. We measure the net loss or gain of trading activity due to limit hits as the difference 
between actual volume on the limit day and counterfactual volume before, during, and after the 
period where a lock-limit event occurs. The counterfactual volume series estimates what would 
have happened if trading was not halted due to the limit. To preserve any market condition in favor 
of a realistic comparison we estimate counterfactual volume using the average intraday volume in 
each time-bin using the average over the last 5-7 days. To accommodate higher average trading 
volume in general on limit move days we adjust our counterfactual volume series to narrow any 
possible gap between volume levels since days that are not limit move days and are used to 
compute our counterfactual tend to present lower daily volume on average. 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖 =  𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖  
∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where the Adjusted Counterfactual Volume on market m, contract c, day t at time bin i is 
equal to the Counterfactual Volume for market m, contract c, day t at time bin i multiplied by the 
ratio between the total Actual Volume and the total Counterfactual Volume on market m, contract 
c, day t at time bin i. With the counterfactual adjusted, the data is merged based on the time-bin 
stamp and the Net Trade variable on market m, contract c at limit day t is calculated which is 
essentially the difference between the total Adjusted Counterfactual Volume on limit day t for all 
time-bin i and the total Actual Volume on limit day t for all time-bin i. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− ∑ 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑚,𝑐,𝑡,𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Trading volume generally is larger than the counterfactual right before and at the period 
when the limit hits and lower when the limit has been hit for a long time. When prices return to 
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levels inside the limit bound, trading volume peaks again creating a similar U-shaped pattern. This 
illustrates that price limits have a lag effect on trading activity. Therefore, three variables are 
created to capture those effects. The Min. Lock variable, which is the sum of minutes when prices 
stayed locked on the limit level on market m, contract c at limit day t is created to capture the 
duration effect. Since prices are locked at the limit level, some market participants understand that 
prices are not realistic and reduce their trades at this level thus reducing trading activity. The Min. 
lock with Gap variable is the period starting from the moment of the first limit hit until the end of 
the last limit hit on market m, contract c at limit day t and is calculated to make able to get our 
third variable The Gap variable is essentially the total minutes that prices are not locked at the 
limit level between the moment of the first limit hit until the end of the last limit hit and controls 
the lag effect of price limits on trading activity.  
𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
 Trading activity dynamic models 
Positive values of net trade indicate trading activity loss because the counterfactual volume 
is higher than the actual volume. Due to the limit hit, part of the volume who was supposed to exist 
based on our counterfactual volume curve is lost. On the other hand, negative values of net trade 
indicate trading activity gain. The actual volume during a limit day is greater than our 
counterfactual volume curve which shows an increment on trade activity due to the limit hit. 
To identify relationships between our measure of the trading volume change in trading 
volume caused by the imposition of price limits, we estimate five regression models with net trade 
as the dependent variable. The first model considers the level of Net Trade as a function of Min 
Lock, Gap, Total Volume and our control variables Lag Extreme, Vix, Report, and Life used on 
previous models for our ex-ante analysis. The second model estimates exclusively the level trade 
loss (positive net trade values) using the same controls as the first model control variables and the 
third one estimates exclusively the level of trade gains (negative net trade values) using the control 
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variables used before. Our fourth and fifth model is similar to second and third, however, our 
dependent variables are expressed in natural logarithm form to provide margin effects in 
percentage (Log-level coefficients)  
For the first model, we use Net trade on market m, contract c at limit day t as our dependent 
variable without distinguishing positive and negative values. As our control variables, KC is a 
dummy variable equals unity when Net trade happens on Kansas City wheat contract c at limit day 
t. Min.Lock is the sum of minutes that price stayed locked on the limit level on market m, contract 
c at limit day t. The Gap is the total amount of minutes where the price is not locked at the limit 
level between the moment of the first limit hit until the end of the last limit hit on market m, 
contract c at limit day t. The variables KC_Min.lock and KC_Gap are interaction variables between 
our Market variable KC and our variables of interest Min.lock and Gap. They are created in order 
to know the intensity of the effect of our variables of interest on trading activity for both markets, 
Kansas City and Chigaco. TotalVol is the total volume on market m, contract c at limit day t.  
LagExtreme is a dummy variable equals to unity when the day before a limit day t, on market m 
and contract c (price change equals or greater than 25 cents). VIX represents the CBOE Volatility 
index at limit day t. Report is a dummy variable equals unity when any supply and demand related 
report is release at limit day t and Life is the number of days before the expiration of contract c, on 
market m at limit day t. 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐾𝐶_𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐾𝐶_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
The second model uses as the dependent variable levels of Trade loss (Net trade positive 
values) on market m, contract c at limit day t which are all positive values of net trade variable 
previously calculated. All other control variables are like the first model. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐾𝐶𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐾𝐶_𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐾𝐶_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 +  𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡   
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Our third model uses as the dependent variable levels of Trade gain on market m, contract 
c at limit day t which is all negative values of net trade variable previously calculated. This variable 
is adjusted to positive values to facilitate coefficient interpretation. All other control variables are 
similar to the last model described. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐾𝐶_𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽5𝐾𝐶_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑐,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 
The fourth and fifth models are based on the same concept as the second and third models, 
however, our dependent variable for both is expressed in natural logarithm form. We design those 
models to obtain coefficient interpretation in percentage (Log-level model).  
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠)𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐾𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐾𝐶_𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  + 𝛽5𝐾𝐶_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +
 𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡   
 
𝑙𝑛(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛)𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐾𝐶_𝑀𝑖𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐾𝐶_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑎𝑔𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑚,𝑐,𝑡  
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Chapter 4 - Results and Discussion 
In this section, we discuss our results for both approaches: 1) ex-ante effects of price 
limits and; 2) ex-post effects of price limits. For the former, we present results from a set of 
linear probability models including the estimated change in the probability of limit moves in the 
presence of different price limit levels. For the latter, I present estimates of the difference 
between actual and counterfactual volume on limit move days and consider correlation between 
this outcome and a set of covariate factors. 
 Ex-ante effects 
Limit moves are not common market events. Table 1 presents a descriptive overview of 
the data. The baselines for extreme and limit moves are displayed for each market in our study. 
The sample we use includes the four major wheat markets, CBOT, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and 
Paris composing a total of 37584 daily observations where each observation is a day in a contract 
for each market from January 2014 to April 2019. The sample presents a well-distributed share 
among all the markets, 26.06% (CBOT), 25.06% (KC), 21.79% (MGEX),  and 22.49% (Paris). 
Including all markets, our baseline probability for extreme moves is 1.11%. 
Table 1 - Extreme and limit move descriptive statistics for the wheat futures market 
 
Variable Mean or % Sum Mean or % Sum Mean or % Sum Mean or % Sum Mean or % Sum
Regular Moves 92.76% 34863 92.33% 9668 91.99% 8709 93.40% 8062 99.66% 8424
Extreme Moves 1.11% 416 1.21% 127 1.40% 133 1.47% 127 0.32% 29
Limit Moves 0.05% 19 0.09% 9 0.10% 9 0.01% 1 0.00% -
Limit 60 76.04% 26826 100.00% 9795 100.00% 8842 100.00% 8189 0.00% -
Limit 50 49.09% 17320 92.91% 9101 92.95% 8219 0.00% - 0.00% -
Limit 35 36.66% 12933 73.35% 7185 65.01% 5748 0.00% - 0.00% -
Limit 30 16.27% 5739 31.01% 3037 30.56% 2702 0.00% - 0.00% -
N 35279 - 26.06% 9795 25.06% 8842 21.79% 8189 22.49% 8453
Full Sample CBOT KC MGEX EBM
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When compared with other markets, Minneapolis presents the higher extreme move 
baseline probability of 1.47% followed by Chicago and Kansas city with 1.21% and 1.40%,  
respectively. On the other hand, Paris has the lowest baseline of 0.32%. 
 The close extreme move baseline between Chicago and Kansas City can be explained by 
the fact that these prices are highly correlated, which maximizes the chance that an extreme move 
in a Chicago contract is transmitted to Kansas City and vice-versa.  
For limit moves, we can observe the uncommonness of the event. Overall, 0.05% is the 
frequency that a limit move occurs, which gives us only 19 events throughout the entire sample. 
Evaluating the markets, Chicago and Kansas City have almost the same baseline with 0.09% and 
0.10%, respectively. MGEX baseline is low due to just one limit move and also because of the 
fixed daily price limit. The daily price limits for CBOT and KC pass by a reset every six months. 
Observing the variables Limit50, Limit35, Limit30 we concluded that CBOT has a longer period 
when the daily price limit is more restrictive (i.e. Limit35) than KC. MGEX has a daily price limit 
set at 60 cents since January 2014 without changing. The changing in daily price limits is an 
important feature from our sample because we are evaluating ex-ante relationships between the 
daily price limit levels and the probability of those thresholds to be crossed.  
In our sample, extreme movements happen mostly in 2014 (153 observations, 36.34%) and 
2017 (121 observations, 28.74%) which present an annual average VIX of 14.82 and 11.24, 
respectively and is the period where CME established the limit level reset policy. The VIX can 
serve as a parameter for volatility, but commodity markets (especially wheat) can have other 
volatility proxies that could be hard to measure. When evaluating limit moves, most of them 
happened in 2017 and 2018 on CBOT and KC wheat contracts. 
Table 2 displays the results for four regressions. The first two estimate the probability of 
extreme movements as a function of (1) limit levels of 50, 35, 30 cents and (2) a Tight variable 
which describes whether the actual limit level was decreased or unchanged (=1) or  increased (=0) 
22 
relative to the level over the previous six months. Overall, models 1 and 2 show a global F test 
significant at 1% level and Adjusted R-squared of 0.045 and 0.044, respectively. Observing the 
market’s coefficients, KC contracts present on average a higher increase (0.017%) in the 
probability of extreme movements which has a baseline of 1.11% for the whole sample and 1.40% 
only counting Kansas City relative to Paris. The second model shows KC and CBOT with higher 
results, 0.014% and 0.012% increase on average for each market, respectively relative to Paris. 
The limit’s coefficient shows a negative impact on the probability of extreme movements. 
However, just Limit30 displays a significant coefficient of -0.009%. The variable Tight was 
statistically significant at 1% level and shows a negative impact (0.008%) on the likelihood of an 
extreme movement relative to its previous 6 month limit level period. This result corroborates with 
our first model where tighter limit levels can increase the probability of extreme movements. Lag 
extreme variable (Extremet-1) and Lag Limit move, which is one of our controls and represents the 
occurrence of an extreme move and limit move on the previous day, respectively, presents a 
relatively large positive effect on the probability of an extreme move for both models. Significant 
at 1%, the increment caused by an extreme move on the previous day is 0.152% on average in an 
overall baseline of 1.14% and for the occurance of a limit move on the previous day increase the 
probability by 0.138% on average. This variable behaves as a hindsight for limit moves which 
could work as a signal for traders to develop their strategies. Variables such as Vix, Volume 
(expressed in the natural log), Contract Life (Life) and Delivery Period are included as controls 
aiming to clear the effect of limit levels and tightness. The Reset windows variables are included 
to analyze price limit levels using the Difference-in-difference model. 
After adjusting for differences in the probability of limit moves across markets, we consider 
the time variables for all models to control the effect of the variation previded by every 6-month 
reset on limit levels. The impact of those variables expressed on their coefficients are only valid 
for the time period under analysis, but can enlighten some information. Except for the first 2017 
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reset window for model 1 (which shows no statistical significance), all of them presented negative 
impact on the extreme movement likelihood and were statistically significant. Figure 2 displays 
the estimated likelihood of extreme movements from model 1 using control (Paris) and all other 
three market data on a six months average basis. The period before 2014 is our reference for 
comparison since it was excluded from our models to avoid singularity issures.  
Table 2 - Regression Results from the four linear probability models 
 
 Extreme Limit Move 
 Limit level Tightness Limit level Tightness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
CBOT 0.016*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.009 (0.050) 0.027 (0.039) 
KC 0.017*** (0.004) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.005 (0.050) 0.007 (0.042) 
MGEX 0.008*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.009 (0.041) -0.025 (0.040) 
Limit50 -0.007 (0.005)  0.009 (0.052)  
Limit35 -0.001 (0.003)  0.030 (0.046)  
Limit30 -0.009*** (0.003)  0.168*** (0.055)  
Tight  -0.008*** (0.002)  0.066* (0.035) 
Extreme(t-1) 0.152*** (0.005) 0.153*** (0.005) 0.062** (0.028) 0.040 (0.028) 
Limit Move(t-1) 0.138*** (0.025) 0.136*** (0.025) 0.625*** (0.077) 0.678*** (0.077) 
Life -0.00004*** (0.00001) -0.00004*** (0.00001) -0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001) 
Delivery 0.023*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004)   
Vix -0.0004** (0.0002) -0.0004** (0.0002) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.006) 
Report 0.011*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.100*** (0.039) 0.116*** (0.039) 
Reset14_1(45¢/50¢) T/T -0.023*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.003) -0.020 (0.056) -0.049 (0.051) 
Reset14_2(35¢/40¢) T/T -0.017*** (0.004) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.022 (0.046) -0.057 (0.041) 
Reset15_1(40¢/40¢) L/T -0.011*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.014 (0.045) -0.028 (0.031) 
Reset15_2(35¢/35¢) T/T -0.024*** (0.004) -0.024*** (0.003) -0.036 (0.065) -0.066 (0.058) 
Reset16_1(30¢/35¢) T/T -0.029*** (0.004) -0.029*** (0.003)   
Reset16_2(30¢/30¢) T/T -0.024*** (0.004) -0.029*** (0.003) -0.011 (0.181) -0.014 (0.183) 
Reset17_1(30¢/30¢) T/T 0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.056 (0.049) 0.022 (0.044) 
Reset17_2(30¢/30¢) T/T -0.023*** (0.004) -0.028*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.096) 0.143 (0.091) 
Reset18_1(35¢/35¢) L/L -0.020*** (0.004) -0.024*** (0.003) 0.025 (0.051) 0.048 (0.036) 
Reset18_2(35¢/35¢) L/L -0.031*** (0.004) -0.035*** (0.003) -0.053 (0.101) -0.034 (0.093) 
Constant 0.035*** (0.004) 0.037*** (0.004) 0.044 (0.099) 0.047 (0.098) 
Observations 35,265 35,265 416 416 
R2 0.045 0.045 0.336 0.308 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.044 0.303 0.276 
Residual Std. Error 0.106 (df = 35242) 0.106 (df = 35244) 0.175 (df = 395) 0.178 (df = 397) 
F Statistic 
75.914*** (df = 22; 
35242) 
83.039*** (df = 20; 
35244) 
10.010*** (df = 20; 
395) 
9.795*** (df = 18; 
397) 
Source: Study’s results using futures data from Bloomberg terminal                                                                           *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
Note:Reset variables present the period of change (i.e Year_half), limit levels established on each market (CBOT/KC) in cents, and 
Tight/Loose limit levels (CBOT/KC) 
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In early 2014, the limit levels reset from 60 cents to 45. This considerable reduction (tighter 
limit level) impacted negatively the probability of extreme movements in comparison to the period 
before when price limits were static. According to our models the first 2014 reset window 
coefficient is one of the largest ones in magnitude. We observed a considerable decrease in the 
probability of extreme movements for both control and markets from the first 2015 reset window 
until late 2016 in comparison with the static period which consists of tight reset windows with 
negative statistically significant coefficients. The first 2017 reset window (Positive coefficient) 
indicates a period when the probability of extreme move would return to similar levels as the static 
period (before 2014) as Figure 2 shows. Those levels would be significantly greater (approximally 
3.5%) than our data baseline of 0.24% for Paris (Control) and 1.4% for the other markets on 
average in daily terms, however not statistically significant 
The next period of tighter reset windows occurred from late 2017 until late 2018 with an 
ambiguous behavior. Late 2017, the daily limit stayed at the same level as of late 2016, however, 
this period shows the higher probability levels only reducing late 2018. In this period is clear to 
see the difference in reaction over Paris and other markets. The level’s magnitude and how sharp 
is the response in CBOT, KC, and MGEX can be seen through this period. The results from the 
first models are aligned with the Holding back hypothesis (Subrahmanyam 1997) that price limit 
helps to decrease volatility which in our analysis can be observed as a contraction in the probability 
of extreme movements. Brogaard and Roshak (2015) conclude that circuit breaks such as price 
limit can improve market stability by decreasing large movements and our present results so far 
can lead us to a similar conclusion. However, some trade-off would probably be involved to 
acquire this stability, such as a reduction in price discovery. 
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Figure 2 - Probability of extreme movement for control (Paris) and Markets (including 
CBOT, KC, and MGEX) 
 
The next two models estimate the probability of a limit move given the occurrence of an 
extreme movement. The same description of the first two models applies to those, where we use 
the limit levels variable and tightness. Our third model overall presents an Adjusted R-squared of 
0.303 and a global F test significant at a 1% level. With a better goodness-of- fitness relative to 
the past models, the 30-cent limit level coefficient presented statistically significant at 1% with a 
relatively large positive effect on the probability of a limit move (0.168% increase over a 0.05% 
overall baseline). The result is intuitive. Since 30 cents is the most restrictive limit level in our 
limit level historical series it is logical to show an increment in the probability of limit move given 
extreme movements. However, considering that our coefficient is based relative to our control 
(Paris), we can assume that the positive marginal effect on the conditional probability of a limit 
move supports the Magnetism hypothesis (Subrahmanyam (1994), Chan et.al. (2005) and Treynor, 
(2019)). Another powerful insight is regarding the Lag Limit move variable. This variable gives a 
hindsight on the probability of a limit move that could help market participants to place their orders 
and strategies. The occurrence of a limit move on the previous day increase the probability by 
0.678% with a base line of 0.05%. 
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The last model considers tightness. It presents an Adjusted R-square  of 0.276 and a global 
F test statistically significant at 1% level. Besides present a lower goodness-of-fit, the variable 
Tight is significant at 1% level and corroborates with the conclusion observed for the third model 
where the Magnet hypothesis is supported since it counts for all restriction increase throughout all 
limit level. 
Figure 3 displays the estimated probability of limit moves conditional to extreme 
movements occurrence in MGEX, KC, and CBOT using model 4 due to the tight variable presence. 
The same periods from Figure 2 are highlighted and the coefficient effects are only valid for 
comparions throughout the period analyzed. We find opposite results from our first two models 
observing the shaded area from the first reset window in 2015 to second in 2016. This period 
presents limit levels with negative marginal effects on the probability of extreme moves on the 
first two models, however, our estimates for the probability of limit moves conditional to extreme 
moves increase in those periods. Those tight windows marginal increments on the probability of a 
limit move after the occurrence of an extreme move corroborate with the “Magnet” hypothesis 
taking limit moves as a proxy for volatility. Paris was not displayed because the probability of hit 
the limit is always zero (since it is our control). 
 
Figure 3 - The estimated probability of limit moves in markets CBOT, KC, and MGEX 
conditional to extreme movements in markets and Paris. 
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The second period highlighted from late 2017 to late 2018 shows a loose limit level. The 
last two windows were classified as loose since the limit level starts to get wider (from 30 cents to 
35 for both Chicago and KC contracts). Even with negative effects on the coefficients, the 
probability of limit moves drastically drops on this period which empirically still corroborates with 
our positive relationship between tightness and probability of limit moves conditional to extreme 
moves. This section of our series supports the Magnetism hypothesis and is aligned with our 
regression results for model 4 where a tight limit level increases the probability of limit move 
(loose limit level decrease probability of limit move). 
Our findings on the second probability estimation regarding limit move conditional to 
extreme movement occurrence support the Magnetism hypothesis in a certain way, where tighter 
limit levels increase the probability of a limit move. It is known that our sample size for limit 
moves conditional to extreme movements is small (416 observations) and only 19 days where price 
reached the limit threshold. Etienne, Irwin, and Garcia (2015) evaluate price explosiveness on 
corn, soybeans and wheat futures markets from 2004-2013. On their findings, only 2% of the whole 
sample experience a price explosive moment and, regarding wheat contracts, only ten, twenty-five 
and twenty-seven business days had price explosiveness for CBOT, Kansas City and Minneapolis 
contracts. Their conclusion reinforces how rare those events are but still could generate substantial 
implications for the market. 
 Ex-post effects 
The ex-post effects of price limits are evaluated in this study by observing trading volume 
during limit days and through the use of an estimated counterfactual for trading volume in that 
market-contract-day, infer price limit effects on trading volume. 
To better understand our results, the first step is to evaluate the duration of all limit moves 
observed in our data sample against net trade, which is the difference between our adjusted 
counterfactual volume and the actual volume at the limit move day and is expressed by the variable 
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Min.lock. Table 3 shows the ex-post data summary statistics. The greater sum of minutes with 
price locked at the limit level is 190 and is related with a max net trade loss of approximally 9200 
contracts. For net trade gains, the data shows a max sum of minutes equals to 164. Our data shows 
a greater number of observations where net trade gains happened in comparison with net trade 
loss, but the max net trade loss (9159 contracts) is greater than the max net trade gain (3576 
contracts) observed.  
Table 3 - Ex-post data summary statistics 
 
To better understand this relationship between limit lock duration and net trade behavior 
those two dimensions are displayed in Figure 4 and Figure 5 for trade losses and gains. For both, 
it is possible to observe a positive relationship between long periods of limit locks and trade gains 
and losses, however, this behavior is more evident for trade losses. It is worth mentioning that this 
relationship seen in those figures are not for a continuous limit lock but by the total sum of minutes 
that prices stayed at the limit level. Observing the data, we notice different trading activity 
responses according to how long and if there were gaps within limit locks. 
Variable Sum Sum Sum
Max min. lock 190 190 164
Min min. lock 1 1 1
Median min. lock 14 11 15
Average min. lock 24.69 26.98 23.36
Max Gap 1128.67 1128.67 1101.92
Min Gap 0 0 0
Median Gap 48.87 37 57.6
Average Gap 122.01 131.47 117.56
Max Net trade 9159.27 9159.27 3576.13
Min Net trade -3576.13 0.001 0.001
Median Net trade -9.1 9.02 50.63
Average Net trade 0.95 382.2 218
N 392 143 249
Full Sample Trade Loss Trade Gain
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Figure 4 - Trade loss and the total length time of limit lock 
 Trading volume doesn’t respond immediately to a limit hit. Volume tends to shift around 
a limit hit where a peak is evident before prices bind with the limit taking a moment to reduce to 
lower levels.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Trade gain and the total length time of limit lock 
This delay effect of price limits on trading volume could restate the classical U-shaped 
volume curve inside a trading session where a volume peaks would be seen around a limit hit and 
another one right after prices come back to the range. To investigate this effect, Table 4 enlights 
the subject. Our five models are displayed in the table where the first, second and third are 
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implemented with levels of net trade as our dependent variable. The last two use the natural 
logarithm aiming more comprehensible coefficients. 
Table 4 - Regression results from ex-post effect model designs 
 Nominal Logarithm 
 All Data Trade Loss Trade Gain Log Trade Loss Log Trade Gain 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Min.lock 12.952*** 26.371*** 5.251*** 0.061*** 0.023* 
 (1.940) (3.475) (1.346) (0.014) (0.014) 
KC_Min.lock -12.566*** -23.841*** -3.470 0.009 0.118*** 
 (3.626) (6.283) (2.423) (0.026) (0.025) 
Gap -1.199*** -2.542*** 0.827*** -0.003 0.002 
 (0.323) (0.639) (0.195) (0.003) (0.002) 
KC_Gap 1.165*** 2.612*** -0.847*** 0.005 -0.023*** 
 (0.418) (0.797) (0.260) (0.003) (0.003) 
Total Vol 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.001 0.00002** 0.00000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
KC 219.389** -124.499 -85.338 -2.416*** -2.394*** 
 (108.456) (199.271) (70.921) (0.811) (0.741) 
Extreme(t-1) -2.146 -190.114 -132.468* -1.181 -0.648 
 (126.212) (261.731) (74.493) (1.065) (0.779) 
Vix 0.780 6.636 -0.538 0.005 -0.033 
 (4.579) (11.389) (2.586) (0.046) (0.027) 
Report -132.911 -256.530 -50.517 0.204 -0.863 
 (143.444) (338.580) (81.563) (1.378) (0.853) 
Life 3.168** 6.135** 0.348 0.006 -0.010 
 (1.411) (2.365) (0.954) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant -709.153*** -981.101*** 82.689 0.643 4.975*** 
 (192.715) (372.052) (124.820) (1.514) (1.305) 
Observations 392 143 249 143 249 
R2 0.139 0.463 0.263 0.330 0.429 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.422 0.232 0.280 0.405 
Residual Std. 
Error 
792.546 (df = 381) 894.224 (df = 132) 388.033 (df = 238) 3.640 (df = 132) 4.057 (df = 238) 
F Statistic 
6.137*** (df = 10; 
381) 
11.378*** (df = 10; 
132) 
8.481*** (df = 10; 
238) 
6.511*** (df = 10; 
132) 
17.914*** (df = 10; 
238) 
 
Source: Study’s results using futures data from Bloomberg terminal and CQG intraday data             *p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01 
Notes: Trade loss and Trade gain are distinguished by the sign. Net trade positive values are trade loss and negative values are 
gain 
 
 All models present an F statistic significant at 1% level. All models presented a fair 
goodness-of-fit with the higher adjusted R2 for model 2 (0.422) and lowest for model 1 (0.116).  
Among the level models, Min.lock coefficient presented statistically significant at 1%. The 
marginal effect of an extra minute locked at the limit level is positive for both trade loss and gain, 
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however, on average its impact is greater for losses (26 contracts for an additional minute locked 
at the limit level). Moreover, the overall model using net trade variable as a linear variable 
(accounting for positive (trade losses) and negative (trade gains)) shows a positive marginal effect 
for Min.lock which increases trading activity loss by approximately 13 contracts for an additional 
minute. The same conclusion can be seen from our Log-level models. The marginal effect of an 
additional minute in the sum of minutes where prices stay at the limit level increase more trading 
activity losses (6.1% for an additional minute) than trading activity gains (2.3% for an additional 
minute).  
The delay effect of price limits can be explained through the Gap coefficient. Empirically 
we can see that short limit locks our limit days with large gaps show the occurrence of a U-shaped 
pattern in the volume curve. Practically, the peak in volume due to a limit hit is not compensated 
by the halt on trading activity if prices would stay locked at limit levels. The coefficients of our 
level models show this. The longer the gap, the greater is trading activity gain.  
 In the level models, the marginal effect of an additional minute for the gaps increases 
trading activity gains. In the trade loss model, an additional minute in the gap reduces trade loss 
by 0.868 contracts and in the trade gain model, 0.281 contracts. In our log-level models, the results 
are in the opposite direction where an additional minute in the gap between limit hits reduces 
trading activity gains by 1%. One reason for the increment in trading activity could be that non-
commercial traders reduce their net short and net long positions when an upper and lower limit 
gets hit to cover their margin calls (Janardanan et.al., 2019).  
The intensity of gains and losses on trading activity are different according to our model. 
The Kansas City interaction variables KC_Min.lock and KC_gap help to understand the different 
intensities the effect of our variables of interest have on both markets. To obtain the effect of an 
extra minute locked at the limit and the effect of an extra minute in a gap for Kansas City we need 
to calculate the sum of Min.Lock and Gap coefficient and the interaction coefficients, respectively. 
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In this case, the marginal effect of an extra limit locked at the limit in Kansas City is relatively 
small (approximately 3 contracts) to Chicago. The same conclusion can be seen for the gap 
interaction variable. Overall, a gap between limit hits increase trading activity gains. However this 
effect is lower in Kansas City relative to Chicago due to the sum of coeffients (Gap and KC_Gap) 
being almost zero. A reasonable evidence to support this result is the difference in magnitude of 
trade gains and losses observed on both markets. Figure 6 illustrate this difference in magnitude 
by displaying the amount of minutes locked at the limit versus trade gains and losses. Clearly, 
CBOT values for trade gains and losses are fairly greater than KC showing that by the fact that 
CBOT wheat contracts presenting a higher volume on average compared with KC makes the effect 
of limit move on trading activity more intense in CBOT. The same pattern can be seen for gap 
values. 
 
Figure 6 - Trade gains and losses for Chicago and Kansas City contracts in nominal level 
(contracts) 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
In this study, we use future price and volume data from the four major wheat futures 
markets, Chicago , Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Paris to estimate the ex-ante and ex-post effects 
of price limits. We estimate the impact of changing price limits on the probability of extreme 
movements and the probability of limit moves conditional on the occurrence of extreme 
movements similar to Brogaard and Roshak (2015). For the ex-post effects, we investigate how 
trading activity behaves before, during and after a limit hit.  
 In our ex-ante assessment, the results indicate that tighter limit levels decrease the 
probability of extreme movements by 0.008% with a baseline probability of 1.11% for all four 
markets studied. In essence, exchanges with the procedure to revise their limit levels periodically, 
when revised to a tighter level, on average reduce the probability of extreme movements based on 
the results generated by the period analyzed in this study. These findings support the “Holding 
Back” hypothesis suggested by Subrahmanyam (1997) with the caveat that extreme movements 
have to be used as a proxy for volatility. However, our estimate for the probability of a limit move 
conditional to extreme movements points the contrary. Logically, tighter limit levels increase the 
probability of limit moves when extreme moves happen which supports the “Magnet” hypothesis 
implied by Subrahmanyam (1994) when we confront the results with our control (Paris) where 
price limits do not apply. Moreover, the occurance of a limit move on the day before could be used 
as a hindsight information since the marginal effect of our Lag Limit move is positive and 
relatively larger when compared with our base line for limit move (0.05%)   
 The ex-post effects of price limit on trading activity are consistent with our empirical 
investigation. Trading activity has a unique behavior when prices are about to hit the limit where 
a U-shaped volume curve traditionally observed in a trading session can repeat itself. This behavior 
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is subject most by how long prices will stay at the limit level and/or if prices will hit the limit level 
multiple times in a session. Our results indicate that the longer is the period where prices are at the 
limit, the greater is the trading activity loss in comparison with a possible trading activity gain. 
Moreover, if prices hit the limit level multiple times in a session and the time between hits is 
longer, the trading session can experience an increase in trading activity. The intensity of those 
effects change through markets as well. Due to its lower daily volume compared with Chicago, 
Kansas City react less to ex-post effects relative to Chicago. 
 The results could help market participants by increasing their information regarding the 
effects of this rare market events and help them navigate efficiently through the commodity 
markets. For policymakers and exchanges, this study could enlighten more information about price 
limit effects on price and trading activity thus supporting them to implement these circuit breaks 
effectively. 
 Further researches could collaborate with the subject by evaluating intraday datasets with 
higher resolutions and for other markets where price limits are constantly hit it and that could show 
inefficient such as Live Cattle and Lumber. Moreover, evaluating the behavior of order in the order 
book could increment the analysis and clarify price limit effects. 
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